The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates by Reuben A. Kessel
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest
Rates





Chapter Title: EXPLANATIONS OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF
INTEREST RATES
Chapter Author: Reuben A. Kessel
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1662
Chapter pages in book: (p. 5 - 43)1
EXPLANATIONS
OF THE TERM STRUCTURE
OF INTEREST RATES
IT IS THE THESIS of this investigation that the term structure of
interest rates can be explained better by a combination of the
expectations and liquidity preference hypotheses than by either
hypothesis alone. Alternatively, these two hypotheses can be viewed
as complementary explanations of the same phenomenon—the term
structure of interest rates. The evidence to be examined in support
of this view falls into two classes. One is the findings of previous
investigators;the works of Macaulay, Culbertson, Meiselman,
Walker, and Hickman contain evidence relevant for evaluating the
substantive merits of this thesis. The other class consists of evidence
gathered as part of the present investigation.
A. What Is the Expectations Hypothesis.
The expectations hypothesis has been enunciated by Fisher, Keynes,
Hicks, Lutz, and others.1 It has had widespread appeal for theoreti-
cal economists primarily as a result of its consistency with the way
similar phenomena in other markets, particularly futures markets,
are explained. In contrast, this hypothesis has been widely rejected
by empirically minded economists and practical men of affairs. It
was rejected by economists because investigators have been unable
to produce evidence of a relationship between the term structure of
interest rates and expectations of future short-term rates. (Others
1 See Friedrich A. Lutz, "The Structure of Interest Rates," in the American
Economic Association, Readings in the Theoiy of Income Distribution, 1'liila-
deiphia, 1946, p. 499; and Joseph \V, Conard, 4n Introduction tO the Theory of
Interest, University of California Press, 1959, Part III.6 Explanations of the
have found it difficult to accept the view that long- and short-term
securities are perfect substitutes for one another in the market.)
Meiselman contends that previous investigators have not devised
operational implications of the expectations hypothesis. Moreover,
he contends, they have examined propositions which were mis-
takenly attributed to the expectations hypothesis, and when these
propositions were found to be false, they rejected the expectations
hypothesis.2
Briefly, the expectations hypothesis asserts that a long-term rate
constitutes an average (a weighted average in the case of coupon-
bearing securities) of expected future short-term rates. It says that
forward rates (or marginal rates of interest) constitute unbiased
estimates of future spot rates.3 It is based on the assumption that
short- and long-term securities, default risks aside, can be usefully
viewed as identical in all respects except maturity. It implies that
the expected value of the returns derived from holding long- and
short-term securities for identical time periods are the same.
The word future should be emphasized in discussing the expec-
tations hypothesis, since it concerns the effects of expectations about
future short-term rates upon the current term structure of interest
rates. To illustrate with a simplified example: assume that two-year
securities yield 3 per cent and one-year securities 2 per cent. The
forward rate on one-year money one year hence, or the marginal
cost of extending a one-year term to maturity for an additional
year, is 4 per cent; this is arithmetic, not the expectations hypoth-
esis. The expectations hypothesis, as interpreted by Lutz and Meisel-
man, but not by Hicks, states that the forward rates are unbiased
estimates of future short-term rates. For the preceding example,
it implies that the market expects the rate on one-year securities
one year hence to be 4 per cent. Four per cent is not only the
forward rate—it is the expected one-year rate one year hence; i.e.,
itis what the market thinks the one-year rate will be one year
hence.
2DavidMeiselman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1962, pp. 10 and 12.
A spot rate is a rate on funds for immediate delivery; itis today's rate for
money to be delivered today for a specified period of time. In contrast, a forward
rate is today's rate for money to be delivered in the future for a specified period
of time. This time period could be anything, a day, a year, or a decade,Term Structure of Interest Rates 7
Conversely, assume a 2 per cent rate on two-year maturities and
a 3 per cent rate on one-year maturities.. Then the yield on one-year
securities one year hence which will equalize the net yield from
holding two one-year securities successively with that of holding one
two-year security is1 per cent. This must follow if one accepts the
view that securities are alike in all respects excep.t term to maturity.4
.B. Existing Evidence
1. MACAULAY
Macaulay was among the first to produce empirical evidence that
related long-term rates to expectations of future short-term rates.
Before the founding of the Federal Reserve System, there existed a
pronounced and well-known seasonal in the call money rate. The
widespread knowledge of the existence of this seasonal implied that
time money rates, which are loans from one to six months that are
otherwise similar to call money loans, should turn up before the
seasonal rise in call money rates. Macaulay found that time money
rates did in fact anticipate the seasonal rise in call money rates and
concluded that this constituted "... evidenceof definite and rela-
tively successful forecasting."Macaulay was unable to uncover
additional evidence of successful forecasting. He warned against
concluding that forecasting was not attempted. Macaulay's conten-
tion was that evidence of successful forecasting is rare because suc-
cessful forecasting is also rare.6
2. HICKMAN
W. Braddock Hickman, in a preliminary, unpublished, but never-
theless widely cited and read, NBER manuscript prepared in 1942,
reports the results of his tests of the expectations hypothesis.7 Like
Macaulay, he sought evidence of successfulforecasting;unlike
Macaulay, he failed to find it. He compared observed or actual
yield curves with those predicted one year 'or more ahead by the
4 These' calculations ignore compounding of interest and intermediate pay-
ments in the form of coupons.
5 Frederick R. Macaulay, Movements of Interest Rates, p. 36. The reappear.
ance of a seasonal in the money market in recent years has made it possible to
reproduce Macaulay's experiment with a new body of data.
6 Ibid., p. 33.
7 W. Braddock Hickman, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Explora-
tory Analysis," National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942,mimeographed.8 Explanations of the
term structure of interest rates, as interpreted by the Lutz-Miesel-
man variant of the expectations hypothesis. For such a comparison,
expected yield curves must be determined at one point and actual
yield curves at a later point of time. If the expectations hypothesis
is valid, Hickman reasoned, then expected yield curves will be corre-
lated with observed yield curves.
Hickman found that simply assuming that this year's yield curve
will be the same as next year's gave what he regarded as better
predictions of subsequently observed yield curves than the expecta-
tions hypothesis. This was one of the early uses of an inertia hy-
pothesis as a benchmark for evaluating the predictive content of a
substantive hypothesis. Hickman did not employ correlation anal-
ysis. If he did, as shall be shown, his conclusion that inertia is the
better predictor would be more difficult if not impossible to sustain.
In addition, he subjected the expectations hypothesis to two addi-
tional tests. (These tests, and the data employed are described in
Appendix A.) All of his tests are based on the view that the validity
of the expectations hypothesis hinges upon accurateforecasts.
Meiselman does not regard this finding as relevant. "Anticipations
may not be realized yet still determine the structure of rates in the
manner asserted by the theory." 8
3. CULBERTSON
Culbertson's empirical research is similar to Hickman's; both ran
tests based on the assumption that forward rates are accurate pre-
dictions of future spot rates. Culbertson examined the yields of
short- and long-term governments for identical periods of time. He
argued that if the expectations hypothesis is valid, then yields to
investors ought to be the same whether short- or long-term secu-
rities are held. (His calculations take into account both income
streams and capital gains and losses.) He found marked differences
in returns for the same holding periods. Since he found it difficult
8 Meiselman, Term Structure of interest Rates, p. 12. Hickman also had some
doubts about the relevance of his test or any other test. The difficulties in con-
ceiving of a means for testing the expectations hypothesis led Conard to con-
tend erroneously, as Meiselman's work demonstrates, that only by assuming the
market predicts accurately is it possible ".... tobuild a theory whose predictions
canbe meaningfullytested." See Conard, Theory of interest, p. 290.Term Structure of Interest Rates 9
tobelieve that speculators would operate in the government secu-
rities markets and predict as badly as his results suggeste.1, he
jected the expectations hypothesis.9
4. WALKER
Walker's test of the expectations hypothesis also was based on the
assumption that the market could predict accurately. However, it
was more like Macaulay's.work in this respect than that of Hick-
man and Culbertson. Both he and Macaulay revealed the consist-
ency between the implications of accurate expectations and the ex-
pectationshypothesis;both observedinstancesinwhich the
expectations of the market could be presumed to be accurate; and
both found the behavior of the market was consistent with the ex-
pectations hypothesis.1°
Walker's work deals with governmental interest rate policy dur-
ing World War II. Around the beginning of that war, the Federal
Reserve System and the Treasury embarked upon a policy of stabil-
izing, through open market operations and the maturity composi-
tion of new issues, the existing levels of rates on government se-
curities. At that time, the yield curve was sharply rising; the bill
rate was three-eighths of 1 per cent, one-year securities yielded 1
per cent, and long-term securities 2.5 per cent. If the expectations
hypothesis is correct, the prestabilization term structure implied
that future short-term rates were expected to be higher than exist-
ing short-term rates. In contrast, the stabilization policy implied
that future short-term rates would be the same as current short-
term rates. When the financial community became convinced that
the monetary authorities could and would make this policy effec-
tive, it also became convinced that existing long-term rates were
inconsistent with revised expectations of future short-termrates:
U".theexplanation of broad movements in the term structure of rates must
be sought principally in factors other than behavior governed by interest rate
expectations." See John M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1957, p. 502.
Meiselman, Term Structure of Interest Rates, p. 12, regards this and Hick-
man's work as tests of nonexistent implications of the expectations hypothesis.
10ChartsE. Walker, "Federal Reserve Policy and the Structure of Interest
Rates on Government Securities," Quarterly Journal of Econo,nics, February
1954, p. 19.10 Explanationsof the
long-term rates were too high. Hence, there was a tremendous shift
out of short- and into long-term securities by the holders of govern-
mental obligations. Such a shift is implied by the expectations hy-
pothesis, given the prewar term structure and its wartime stabiliza-
tjOfl.11 This shift in large part converted the stabilized yield on bills
to a nominal rate similar to some other wartime prices.
Walker's results, unlike Macaulay's findings, cannot be inter-
preted as providing unambiguous support for the expectations hy-
pothesis because they are also consistent with an implication of the
liquidity preference hypothesis. Liquidity preference as a theory
of the term structure of interest rates implies that the longer the
term to maturity of a security, the higher its yield. Yield differen-
tials between long- and short-term securities constitute equalizing
differences that reflect differences in risks of capital losses. The
establishment of a ceiling on long-term bond yields implies a floor
or support price for their capital values. A price support program
•for long-term bonds implies that much of the risk of capital loss is
eliminated. Therefore, long maturities become relatively more at-
tractive investment media.
Although Walker's results do not discriminate between expecta-
tions and liquidity preference, they do discriminate between ex-
pectations and liquidity preference on the one hand and market
segmentation on the other. If the holdings of governments by the
major institutions of the financial community changed as much as
Walker reports they did,this constitutes evidence against the
market segmentation hypothesis; if the market segmentation hy-
pothesis is correct, Walker should not have observed a shift in the
maturity distribution of governments by the major institutions of
the financial community.12
11 If a rising yield curve exists, long-termsecurities yield more than short-
term because the market anticipates offsetting losses on capital account attribu•
table to holding long-term securities. The elimination of these anticipated capi-
tal losses implies that the yield of long-term securities is truly greater than that
of short-term securities.
Conversely a declining yield curve implies that future short-term rates will be
lower. Hence the holders of long-term securities trade a lower income on current
account for anticipated capital gains. The stabilization of such a yield curve
means that these anticipated capital gains cannot be realized, hence, that the
yield of short-term securities is truly greater than that of long-term securities.
12 This interpretation of Walker's findings as well, as the contention that his
results are consistent with liquidity preference does not appear in the originalTerm Structure of Interest Rates 11
The expectations hypothesis has been rejected for its unrealistic
assumptions, particularly the assumption that short- and long-term
securities of equivalent default risk can be treated as perfect sub-
stitutes. Many practitioners in financial markets, committing the
fallacy of composition, reason that no one regards bills and long-
term bonds as alternatives because they observe that many institu-
tions specialize in a particular maturity spectrum. As long as some
ranges of maturities are considered as alternatives by individual
participants in this market, and in the aggregate these ranges cover
the entire maturity spectrum, the market will act as though bills
and bonds are alternatives. Yet every participant in this market
may deal in a highly circumscribed maturity spectrum.
Mrs. Robinson has contended that the purchasers of a consol
must know the course of future interest rates for ..everyday
from today till Kingdom Come." 13 Hickman and Luckett have
enunciated, less colorfully, essentially the same argument.'4
Presumably the size of the bonus a promising high school or col-
lege baseball player receives in exchange for his affiliation with a
major league club is a function of his expected performance as a
ball player. This interpretation, which is widely accepted, implies
that the market predicts the performance of a ball player over his
entire career. In order to properly calculate the size of these. bo-
nuses, the market must predict batting averages, fielding perform-
ance, and, in the case of pitchers, pitching effectiveness. Emotional
stability, which appears to be irrelevant for determining future
short-term rates, must also be predicted for ball players, si;rice many
become emotionally unstable in the face of severe competition and
hence lose some of their economic value.15
paper. Walker regarded his evidence as supporting the Lutz variant of expecta-
tions. For another statement of what the market segmentation hypothesis is, see
Conard, Theory of Interest, p. 304.
13 See Joan Robinson, "The Rate of Interest," Econonzetrica, April 1951, p.
102.
14 Dudley G. Luckett, "Professor Lutz and the Structure of Interest Rates,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1959,p. 131. Hawtrey also seems to
be a member of the school that rejects the expectations hypothesis because of
difficulties in predicting short-term rates. He al-gues that short- and long-term
rates are determined in completely segregated and independent markets. See
Ralph G. Hawtrey, "A Rejoinder," The Manchester School, October 1939,p. 156.
15 The objection to the expectations hypothesis for the lack of ":realism" in
its assumptions has led to an attempt to find an alternative, more realistic set12 Explanations of the
5. MEISELMAN
Meiselman is the first investigator to employ an operational test
of the expectations hypothesis that does not depend upon accurate
foresight for its validity. If a relationship exists between expecta-
tions and the term structure of interest rates, then its existence can
be detected despite inaccurate predictions. The understanding by
economists of how expectations are formed and revised in the light
of new information has improved enormously in recent years.
Meiselman, by utilizing this knowledge, was able to make the ex-
pectations hypothesis operational even when the market could not
anticipate future rates of interest correctly. He showed that ex-
pectations, whether or not they are correct, nevertheless affect the
term structure of rates. His results constitute striking evidence that
the expectations hypothesis has empirical validity.'6
The expectations hypothesis implies that the term structure of
interest rates constitutes at one moment of time a set of predictions
of short-term rates at various moments of time in the fuwre. For
every instant of time, there exists a term structure or yield curve
and a set of implicit forward rates. These forward rates are, if the
hypothesis is correct, expected short-term rates. If two term struc-
tures separated temporally are compared, the earlier contains pre-
dictions of future short-term rates and the later the data, i.e., the
realized or actual short-term rates necessary for an evaluation of the
accuracy of these predictions. Recent work on expectations suggests
that if a realized or actual short-term rate is above its predicted
level, then the predictions for other rates, yet to be realized, will be
revised upward. Conversely, if the actual rate is below the predicted,
then other predicted rates will be revised downward during the time
interval between observations.
of assumptions. Sec Burton G. Malkici, "Expectations, Bond Prices, and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1962,
No.2, p. 197. The author claims his model is "... incloser conformity with the
practices of bond investors who had always considered the Lutz theory chimeri-
cal." (See P.218.) Conformity here should not be interpreted as predicting
better;thereis no test of the predictive powers of the models in the Malkiel
paper. Conformity refers to the conformation of the assumptions of Malkiel's
model with descriptions of how bond investors behave.
10 Meiselnian, Term Structure of interest Rates, Chapter 2.Term Structure of Interest Rates 13
To illustrate: Assume at T0, say January 1, 1960, the following
relationships between yield and term to maturity are revealed by
the market:
Yields as a Function of Term to Maturity at T0




The expectations hypothesis, given this data at T0, implies that the
market expects future one-year rates to be higher than the cur-
rent one-year rate. Since the one-year rate is1per cent and the
two-year rate 2 per cent, the forward rate on one-year money one
year hence must be 3 per cent for the returns on these alternatives
to be equal. Analogously, if the current two-year rate is 2 per cent
and the three-year rate 3 per cent, then the forward rate on one-
year money two years later must be high enough to compensate for
the difference between 2 and 3 per cent for two years. Therefore, a
one-year rate of 5 per cent is implied for two years hence.
Market Predictions atT0of Expected One-Year Rates
Expected one-year rateforT1, the year beginning 1/1/61,is3.0 per cent
1/1/62, 5.0
T3 1/1/63, 7.0
Assume at T1, a year later, that the following relationships be-
tween yield and term to maturity are revealed by the
Yields as a Function, of Term to Maturity at T1
1-year governments yield 2.0 per cent
2 3.3
3 4.0
Clearly the one-year rate observed in the market at T1 (2 per cent)
is less than it was expected to be a year ago (3 per cent). The differ-
ence between the anticipated one-year rate one year hence at T0
and the realized one-year rate at T1 (both rates are for an identical
moment of time but are measured one year apart) is defined as the
error. If recently acquired knowledge on the formation of expecta-
tions is correct, then forecasts of expected one-year rates for T2 and
114 Explanations of the
T3, i.e., for January 1, 1962, and 1963, will have been revised down-
ward during the year 1960, or between T0 and T1.
One can infer from the term structure of interest rates at T0 and
T, how much these estimates of future short-term rates have been
revised.
Market Predictions at T0 and T,
Changein Forecast,
Expected One-Year or Magnitude of
Ratefor One Year, Forecast Revision
Beginning on T0 T1 (per cent)
January 1, 1962 (T2) 5.0 4.6 —0.4
January 1, 1963 (T3) 7.0 5.4 —1.6
At T1 the expected one-year rates beginning at T2 and T3 are 4.6
and 5.4 per cent respectively. The difference between 5.0 and 4.6
per cent measures the change in the forecast one-year rate for T2;
the difference between 7.0 and 5.4 measures the change in the fore-
cast one-year rate for T3. Hence, if the expectations hypothesis is
correct, then errors and forecast changes should be positively cor-
related.'7 Meiselman found that his error terms (i.e., the difference
between predicted and actual one-year rates) and his forecast re-
visions were in fact positively correlated.
The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated interest
rate changes is crucial for an understanding of how Meiselman
tested the expectations hypothesis. If forward rates a year apart are
as depicted by Chart 1, then the expectations hypothesis would im-
ply that there has been no change in the rates forecast. Yet the rates
for one-, two-, and three-year maturities must have changed during
this year; yield curves were not constant. Nevertheless the ex-
pected one-year rates for particular moments of time were un-
changed. The observations that are correlated, i.e., the error term
and the forecast revision, refertointerest rates for particular
(lates.18
17 Meiselinan defines the error as the spot minus the forward; the revision of
the forecast is defined as the later forecast less the earlier.
18 An implication of this distinction is the proposition that stock prices can
vary over time with no change iii expectations of future earnings, if the market
expects earnings tofluctuate. Hence, insofarasinvestors anticipate cyclical
changes in the profitability of enterprises, anticipated cyclical variations in stock
prices should exist.Term Structure of Interest Rates 15
Meiselman cot-related errors with contemporaneous revisions in
forecasts. For the example used, there are two forecast revisions,
—0.4 and —1.6,that are correlated with the error, —1.0.The future
spot rates whose estimates were revised will be observed in the
market as spot, and not forward, rates one and two years after the
spot rate in the error term can be observed. For the data Meiselman
employed, the future spot rates whose estimates were revised will
be observed in the marketspot rates one through eight years
after the spot rate in his error term can be observed. In both the
example and Meiselman's work, forward rates pertaining to subse-
quently observable one-year spot rates for particular moments of
calendar time were observed a year apart. The difference between
observations which pertain to the same spot rate are forecast re-
CHART 1
Marginal Rates of Interest with Stable Expectations
rates yearly, he observed eight forward rate revisions and. one error
term every year (with, of course, the exception of the earliest year
that his data encompasses). Meiselman produced eight :regressions
relating forward rate revisions to errors observed simultaneously.
He found significant relationships for all eight, with correlation
coefficients ranging from a low of .59 to a high of .95. All eight re-
gression lines went through the origin, in the sense that the con-
stant terms of the regressions were insignificantly different from
zero.
This led to the inference that forward rates are unbiased esti-
mates of future spot rates, which implies, when trends in interest
rates are ignored, that yield curves are on the average flat. Short-











hisforward and spot one-year16 Explanations of the
biased upward, then yield curves, again ignoring trends, are on the
average positively sloped. Hence, short-term rates will average less
than long-term rates, and both, on the average, will rise with term
to maturity. Such differentials between different terms to maturity,
usually referred to as liquidity premiums, reflect the greater liquid-
ity of short maturities.'9 Meiselman argues that the absence of a
constant term in his regressions implies the absence of liquidity
premiums. If the constant term is zero, a forward rate that is equal
to the subsequently observed actual spot rate, i.e., a zero error term,
implies no forecast revision. If forecasts are not revised when the
error term is zero, then Meiselman infers that liquidity premiums
are absent. To show that this inference is incorrect, consider the
following formal statement of the hypothesis Meiselman tests:
— = — (1)
Let £ represent expected rates, R spot rates, F forward rates, and
L liquidity premiums. The pre-subscript represents a year of cal-
endar time. The post-subscript measures the moment a rate is either
inferred from the term structure or observed as an actual spot rate.
The forward and spot rates Meiselman considered were for one year
only. Hence, t+mEgis.the expected. one-year spot rate for the year
t + m that is inferred from the term structure of interest rates at
moment t. The expected one-year spot rate for the year t + m that
is inferred from the termstructure of interest rates at moment
£ —1ismEti. The difference between the post-subscripts t and
I —1is, for Meiselman's study, one year.
One cannot observe expected rates directly; the term structure of
interest rates reveals only forward rates. Whether or not EF, or
E + L =Fmust be established by empirical evidence. Suppose li-
quidity premiums exist and they increase monotonically at a de-
creasing rate as a function of term to maturity. Then the longer the
time interval between the moment a one-year forward rate is in-
19TheHicksian view of the term structure of interest rates implies that for-
ward rates are biased and high estimates of future short-term rates. He viewed
the "normal" yield curve as being positively sloped. See John R. Hicks, Value
Capital, London 1946, pp. 135—140. Lutz explicitly rejected the view that
liquidity premiums exist because he could observe short-term rates above corre-
sponding long-term rates and he regarded this as a contradiction of the liquidity
preference hypothesis. See Lutz, in TlieoiyofIncome Distribution, p. 528.Term Structure of Interest Rates 17
ferred from a term structure andthe moment it becomes a spot
rate,the greater the liquidity premium. Similarly, year-to-year
changes in forward rates for specific calendar years will increase as
they get closer in time to becoming spot rates. The largest increase
will occur during the year a forward rate becomes a spot rate.2°
If the forward rate, F, is e4ual to the expected rate, E, plus a
liquidity premium, L, then substituting in (1) yields
(t+mFtt+m1-'t) —(t+mFt_i—t+ns't—_l)= — —
Let— + =AL.Then the restatement of Meiselman's
hypothesis becomes
—rnFt_i = — SF11)+ — AL.
Letting a = — AL,results in
— + (2)
This is the regression equation Meiselman computed. He found
that the observed constant was insignificantly different from zero.
Hence, he inferred that a or —ALis also insignificantly differ-
ent from zero.
A zero constant term is equally consistent with either =
AL=0or =AL> 0. Hence, this 1)iece of evidence is map-
propriate for establishing the validity of the proposition that for-
ward rates are unbiased estimates of expected spot rates; it is Con-
sistent with the existence of liquidity premiums. The proposition
that forward rates are unbiased estimates of future spot rates re-
mains untested.
Meiselman's own work, the work of Hickman, the time series o
short- and long-term governments for the past forty years (to be
presented in Chapter 3), and some new evidence presented here, all
support the view that the term structure of interest rates, as inter-
Feted by the expectations hypothesis, embodies biased and high
estimates of future short-term rates. Meiselman used Durand's yield
curves for high-grade corporates from 1900 through 1954 for his
tests. For each of these years, Durand estimated a yield curve, if an
20Forthe purpose of determining whether or not forward rates arc biased or
unbiasedestimatesof spot rates, the liquidity content of spot rates is irrelevant.
It is only the difference, if any, between the liquidity content of forward and
spotrates that matters.8 9 10
SouRcE:1900—42,Durand, CorporateBonds; 1943—47,Durandand Winn,Basic
Yields of Bonds; 1948—51, The Economic Almanac, 1956 (National Industrial
Conference Board).
during these fifty-five years, forward rates must have been arith-
metically high estimates of spot rates.
If liquidity premiums exist, the. frequency of high estimates ought
to be greater than that of low estimates and the average of the dif-
ferences between estimated and actual rates ought to be positive.
18 Explanations of the
average is computed of the yields for each term to maturity, i.e., an
average of all fifty-five one-year maturities, two-year maturities, etc.,
the composite yield curve which results, reflects average conditions
for all fifty-five years. This curve is in fact positively sloped (see
Chart 2). Since interest rates,if anything, were trending down
CHART 2











Years to maturityTerm Structure of Interest Rates 19
Hence, Meiselman's error terms ought to have a significantly higher
frequency of minus than plus signs and their average ought to be
negative. Tests of these implications with the Wilcoxon two-sample
and signed-rank tests lead to their acceptance.21
The foregoing demonstrates that forward one-year rates were on
the average greater than actual one-year rates. It suggests that they
were also greater than expected one-year rates and that they sys-
tematically overstate what the market expects one-year rates to be.
This conclusion is based on an analysis of the inputs for Meisel-
man's independent variable. What about the dependent variable,
i.e., the forward-rate changes that are regarded by Meiselman as
prediction changes? Since forwarcE rate changes are the difference
between observations, separated by a year, of forward rates that
pertain to a specific spot rate observable in the future, the first
forward rate must be inferred from data further out on a yield
curve than the second. Hence, if liquidity preference is operative
(if it produces positively sloped yield curves), then the first forward
rate ought to be, on the average, greater than the second. Meisel-
man observed prediction changes separated by one through eight
years from the moment of time relevant for the measurement of
the error term. The first forward rate is, on the average, larger than
the second for all eight regressions. Itis hardto rationalize this
observationa chance event; the probability of drawing eight
successive negative numbers from a population in which negative
and positive numbers are equally represented is less than 1 per cent.
On the whole, this evidence is consistent with a positively sloped
yield curve that flattens out as term to maturity increases;it is
what one would expect to be derived from data summarized by
Chart 2.
Meiselman's changes in forward rates and error terms constitute
a measure of the marginal costs, more precisely the rate of change
of yield with respect to term to maturity, of reducing term to
maturity by a year. The pecuniary values at the margin, as revealed
by the market, of liquidity changes attributable to changes in term
21SeeW. Allen Wallis andHarryV. Roberts, .Slalis!ics: ANew Approach,
Glencoe, 1956, pp.596—598.Significance levels of 6 and2per cent were produced
using one tail of the normal distribution. Of the fifty-four forward one-year
rates, thirty-five were high and nineteen were low.20 Explanations of the
to maturity of one year are computed. They behave, roughly speak-
ing, as one would expect; the longer it takes for a forward rate to
become a spot rate, the greater the premium of forward over spot.
With but two exceptions out of a possible nine cases, liquidity pre-



























3mese data were obtained through personal
with Mejealman.
bMean of differences betweenone—year forward and spotrates.
CHeanchangeIn one—year forward rates as term to maturity
decreases by one year.
Hickman's data are consistent with Meiselman's findings. Pre-
clicted yield curves for the years 1936 through 1942, with a year
between the time predicted and actual yield curves are observed,
were all high. Even more interesting, and this is consistent with
Meiselman's data, Hickman's results show that the longer the inter-
val between predicted and observed or actual yield curves, the
greater the bias in the estimates.22 This empirical finding is an
implication of a positively sloped yield curve when trends in rates
are absent.
The data (to be presented in Chapter III) on yields of gov-
ernments for the nine most recent business cycles, a period of
roughly forty years, clearly indicate that the average yields of
!2 Tlicre arc twenty-cight predictions, all toohigh.SecTableA-i. which repro-
duces Hickman's data.Term Structure of Interest Rates 21
short-term governments are less than long-term governments. All
nine cycles, without exception, conform tothis generalization.
These data constitute additional evidence that the term structure
of rates, as interpreted by the expectations hypothesis, yields biased
estimates of future short-term rates. If forward rates are not ex-
pected rates, but expected rates plus a liquidity premium, one
should expect. these time series to show that yields of short-term
governments are usually less than long-term governments. Since
Meiselman and Hickman worked with Durand's data,. which reflect
the yields of high-grade corpora tes, these data on the relative yields
of short- and long-term governments for these nine cycles constitute
independent evidence of the existence of bias in the predictions of
the expectations hypothesis.
Unfortunately, this evidence is not unexceptionable. The fifty-
five yearly observations of Durand, which Meiselman used, have a
downward trend. In 1900, Durand's basic thirty-year rate was 3.30
per cent; in 1954, it was 3.00 per cent. If declining short-term rates
are unanticipated, the predicted rates of the expectations hypothesis
will exceed actual rates. From 1935 through 1942, the downward
trend is still greater; the thirty-year basic rate fell from 3.50 to 2.65.
Hence, if the long-term downward trend in rates has been unantici-
pated by the market, the relationship between the yields of short-
and long-term governments may be a consequence of forecasting
errors.23
Meiselman, like Walker, produced evidence relevant for eval-
uating the validity of the market segmentation hypothesis; unlike
Walker, Meiselman points out the relevance of his work for this
hypothesis.
.
.thesystematic behavior of the yield curve would
appear to contradict the widely held view that the market for debt
claims is 'segmented' or 'compartmentalized' by maturity and that
rates applicable to specific maturity segments can best be analyzed
by rather traditional partial equilibrium supply and demand anal-
ysis where transactors act on the basis of preference for specific
23 Hickman found that a snuple 1)FOjCCtiOfl of the previous year's yield curve
produced numerically closer predictions than the expectations hypothesis, which
is consistent with the foregoing interpretation. His finding isalso, of course,
consistent with an upward bias in the predictions of the expectations hypothesis.22 Explanationsof the
maturities.•• 24The correlation between forward rate revisions
and error terms demonstrates that changes in the yields of one- and
two-year securities are related to changes in yields of maturities up
to nine and ten years. Consequently, at least for this maturity
range, the market is not segmented enough to invalidate this test
of the expectations hypothesis.
C. New Evidence
ConfIning tests of the expectations hypothesis to circumstances for
which expectations can be presumed to be accurate has produced
only fragmentary evidence. Expectations can be presumed to be
accurate only under very special circumstances. Hence, forward
rates can equal expected spot rates and yet differ from realized spot
rates. But even this limited approach has not been fully exploited.
Clearly, in a world in which spot rates are positive, and this would
surely encompass the two most recent decades, one could assume
that the market never expects negative spot rates. Therefore, if
negative forward rates were observed, this would constitute evi-
dence against the expectations hypothesis. Conversely, if negative
forward rates were not observed, this would be evidence for the
hypothesis.
The behavior of the term structure of bill yields during Septem-
ber 1960 contradicts the expectations hypothesis. In that month the
forward rate on one-week money, inferred from the term structure
of bill yields with maturities on December 8th and 15th, was often
negative.25
For nine of the twenty-one trading days in September 1960,
negative forward rates for one-week money could be observed. To
restate the foregoing, on these nine dates in September 1960 (and
this same phenomenon could be observed in September 1959) there
existed some bills whose asked prices were higher than the asked
prices for bills with one week less to maturity. Since it is unreason-
able to argue that the market expected the spot rate for one-week
24Meiselman,Term Structure of Interest Rates, p. 34.
25 The asked prices reported on the quote sheets of C. J. Devine were the
source of price data. Salomon Bros. and Hutzler quote sheets contained data that
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bills on September 8th, or any other week since the end of World
War II, to be negative, it follows that forward rates are not ex-
pected spot rates.
Critics have rejected the expectations hypothesis because the pre-
dictions of future short-term rates implied by the theory differed
from subsequently observed actual rates. Meiselman argues that
these critics have rejected the hypothesis for the wrong reasons. His
position, that expectations need not be correct to determine the
term structure of interest rates, is, of course, valid. Yet, given free
entry and competition in securities markets, should not one expect
to find a relationship between expectations as inferred from the
term structure of interest rates and subsequently observed actual
rates? It is of course unreasonable to expect expectations or predic-
tions of future short-term rates to be absolutely accurate. New in-
formation coming to the market after a prediction is made will
lead to prediction revisions and less than perfect forecasts. Yet new
information should not lead to biases in the estimates; a mean bias
should not be present. Hence, the average difference between pre-
clicted and actual rates ought to be insignificantly different from
zero. The absence or presence of a mean bias in the relationship
constitutes a test of whether or not forward rates are expected
rates. Similarly, for very short intervals between the inference of
predictions and the observation of actual short-term rates, there
should be some observable advantage for the expectations hypoth-
esis over some form of inertia hypothesis as a predictor of future
short-rates. If not, why should the market waste its time and energy,
which are scarce resources, in trying to predict future short-term
1-ates? 20
Tocontrol for trends in rates, and to measure forward and actual
rates uninfluenced by capital gain considerations, the forward and
actual yields of Treasury bills were examined from the beginning of
1959 through March 1962. All of the forward rates implicit in the
26Meiselmanwent too far in dismissing the work of Hickman and Culbertson.
The expectations hypothesis, as he and Lutz interpreted it, does imply that there
ought to be equality in the yields of short- and long-term rates in the absence
of trends. If there is not, either the people operating in this market are doing
an unbelievably bad job or this constitutes çvidence against the Meiselman
sion of the expectations hypothesis.24 Explanations of the
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No. of observations 124 143 146 137 113 125
Frequency of high
predictions 93 132 135 120 91 119
Average size of
errors (per cent) .199 .567 .599 .444 .455 .669
Average actual rates
(per cent) 2.34 2.39 2.54 2.67 2.79 2.91
aBI1IS with precisely 182 and 91 days tomaturity were used to com-
pute theforward 91—day rate.Ninety—one days after this computation,
the spot 91—day rate was observed and compared with the forward rate.
Similarly,billswith1261112, 841 63, 56, 42, 28, and 14days to
maturitywere used to compute forward rates and to measure 8pot rates.
Bid and asked prices1 obtained from government bond dealers, were
averaged to obtain the prices used.The daily quote sheets of Salornon
Bros.& Hutzler, C. J. Devine& Co., were the sources of bid and asked
prices.These daily price reports quote bid and asked prices of bills
for specified days to maturity from the time payment is received.
Forward 91—day rates were computed by subtracting the current 91—day
ratefrom twice thecurrent 182—day rate.This method of computing for-
ward rates increases the difficulties of detecting anupward biasinthe
estimates of the expectations hypothesis.It understates forward rela-
tiveto spot rates.Indeed, if theestimates of the expectations hypo-
thesis wereunbiased1 this computing procedure would show a downward
bias.Bill yields are bankersdiscountyields, and equal discount yields
fordifferentmaturities are not comparable.For example, a 4per cent
discount yield on a 90—day bill implies a yield on a 360—day basis of
4.04 per cent.In contrast, a 4 per cent discount yield on a 180—day
bill implies a yield of 4.08 on a 360—day basis.In general, the longer
the term to maturity of a bill, the more its discount yield understates
itsbond equivalentyield.Hence, the procedure followed produces lower
estimates of forward rates than would be produced by a correct computation.
term structure of interest rates during that time for two-, four-, six-,
eight-, nine-, and thirteen-week bill rates were computed and com-
pared with actual yields. The time period under investigation began
and ended with the 91-day bill rate at the same level, approximately
2.75 per cent, although it rose sharply to 4.50 per cent and fell to
2.25 before it came back to its original level. The results of this in-
vestigation are tabulated in Table 2.
These results, along with the evidence already cited, stronglyTerm Structure of Interest Rates 25
supportthe belief that forward rates are biased and high estimates
of future short-term rates. Hence they are not the predict ions of
the market. In addition, these findings support the common belief
that there exists a preference for short-term over long-term securities
in the market. This preference produces a yield differential that
constitutes an equalizing difference. The greater pecuniary yield of
long-term securities represents compensation for the nonpecuniary
advantages associated with holding short-term securities.
These findings also suggest that the futures market for money
may be unlike other futures markets. Generally, one finds that for-
ward prices are below corresponding SPOt prices when spot prices
are rising and above them when spot prices are falling. For the
futures market for money, however, forward rates in the Treasury
bill market are typically above spot rates even when the latter are
rising. During an upswing, the extent to which this occurs narrows,
and some reversals, i.e., spot rates in excess of forward rates, occur.
these reversals are su prisingly infrequent.
On theoretical grounds, one should expect liquidity
to vary with the level of interest rates. Treasury bills, like other
securities, can be viewed as providing two streams of income: one
is a pecuniary yield measured by interest rates; the other is a non-
pecuniary yield as a money substitute. The average difference in
28- and 56-clay bill yields can be viewed as an equalizing difference
that reflects the greater value of the former as a money substitute.
Economists customarily think of a rise in interest rates as implying
an increase in the cost of holding money. By parity of reasoning,
an increase in interest rates should also imply an increase in the
cost of holding money substitutes. Since 28-clay bills are better
money substitutes than 56-day bills, a rise in interest rates implies
that the opportunity costs of holding the former should rise relative
to that of holding the latter. For this condition to be satisfied,
yields of 56-clay bills must rise relative to those of 28-day bills. Such
a rise implies an increase in liquidity premiums, i.e., an increase in
the spread between forward and actual 28-day rates. This reasoning
is consistent with the results obtained for the range of bill maturities
studied; the opportunity costs of holding any specified maturity,
instead of a longer and hence less liquid maturity, increases as26 Explanations of the
interest rates rise. Conversely, these opportunity costs decrease when
rates fall. Within the range of bill maturities observed, and con-
trary to what is true for the yield curve as a whole, yield curves
are steepest when rates are high and flattest when rates are low.
If the spread between 28- and 56-day bills increases with a rise in
rates, and if liquidity premiums increase, then the premium of
forward over spot money should also increase. This implies that
what Meiselman and Hickman erroneously regarded as error terms,
the difference between forward and subsequently observedspot
rates, should be a positive function of the current level of spot rates.
To determine whether or not this inference is correct, the difference
between forward and subsequently observed 28-day spot rates was
regressed on current 28-day spot rates. This is equivalent to regress-
ing liquidity premiums plus or minus a forecasting error on current
28-day rates. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
liquidity premiums rise with the level of spot rates. The premium
of forward over spot 28-day rates increases by one basis point for
every increase of about five basis points in the spot rate.
The foregoing conclusion was derived from 137. monthly observa-
tions during the three business cycles from October 1949 through
February 1961. They are supported by the results obtained from a
regression using 138 weekly observations of 91- and 182-clay bills
from January 1959 through February 1961. For the latter test, the
regression coefficient was about twice the former. A rise of about two
and a half basis points in the 91-day bill rate is associated with a
rise of about one basis point in the premium of forward over spot
91-day rates.27
27 For the 91-day bills, the weekly obscrvations cover a period when there were
182- and 91-day bills outstanding simultaneously. regression coefficient was
.43 with a standard error of .05.
Forthe 28-day bills, observations were obtained once a month. Typically, more
than one observation could have been used in any month. The observation
chosen was the one closest tothe middle of the month. The regression coefficient
was .22 with a standard error of .03.
The effects of bankers discount were eliminated fromthese data.
The association of a rise in liquidity premiumswitha rise iii the level of rates
can also be shown by regressing the difference between forward and subsequently
observed spot rates upon their sum.
The validity of these tests depends upontheabsence of positive correlation
between forecasting errors and spot rates. Unfortunately it is difficult to disen-
tangle forecasting errors from liquidity premiums.Term Structure of Interest Rates 27
Since both interest rates and business conditions vary with the
cycle, the finding that liquidity premiums rise with interest rates
raises the question, are liquidity premiums a function of the level
of interest rates or of the stage of the business cycle? In order to
investigate this question, forward and actual 28-day bill rates were
computed monthly from the term structure of 56- and 28-day bills
for the three latest complete business cycles. During these three
cycles, there was an upward trend in interest rates. Therefore, if
liquidity premiums vary with the level of rates, it should be pos-
sible to observe that they rise secularly. The regression of the dif-
ference between predicted and actual 28-day rates on time for these
three cycles does indicate an upward trend. Hence, liquidity pre-
miums are positively related to the level of interest rates.28
The existence of liquidity premiums implies that the expectations
hypothesis yields biased and high estimates of future short-term
rates. It does not reveal in any direct way whether or not the
market has any power to correctly anticipate subsequently observed
spot rates. If liquidity premiums are held constant, if expected and
not forward rates are observed, does a significant relationship exist
between these expected rates and subsequently observed spot rates?
Forward rates for specific periods of calendar time and subse-
quently observed spot rates for the same periods were subjected to
correlation analysis. This corrects, in a very crude way, for bias in
the estimates of future spot rates attributable to liquidity premiums.
Forward rates, which can be regarded as market predictions when
adjusted for liquidity premiums, were inferred from the ter:m struc-
ture of 182- and 91-day bill rates. (These rates were computed
using an average of bid and asked prices adjusted for bankers
discount.)
The results of this test indicate that the expectations hypothesis
definitely does have predictive content. For 138 predictions of 91-
day bill rates from the beginning of 1959 through the first quarter
of 1962, the expectations hypothesis explained 58 per cent of the ob-
served variation. The question remains whether an inertia hypothe-
28Of137 predictions of the Lutz variant of the expectations hypothesis, 121
were high, five low, and eleven were correct. The effects of bankers discount were
eliminated from these data.28 Explanationsof the
sis could do equally well or better. Perhaps the observed correlation
could be attributable to serial correlation in the data.
To determine whether or not the results obtained should be im-
puted to correct expectations, two variants of an "inertia hypoth-
esis" were considered. One "predicted" 91-day bill rates 91 days
hence by assuming no change. The other extrapolated into the
future the difference between current 91-day rates and those 91
days ago.
The correlations for both variants of the inertia hypothesis tested
were the same; each explained 48 per cent of the observed variation.
The expectations hypothesis explained approximately 20 per cent
more of the observed variation. During most of the period of obser-
vation, from about the middle of 1959 through the middle of 1960,
there was a sharp rise and fall in rates. For the remainder of the
period, interest rates were roughly stable. If the two hypotheses are
compared for the period when rates were highly unstable (this
reduces the number of observations tofifty),then expectations
explain 48 per cent of the observed variations, whereas the variants
of inertia each explain 30 per cent. The comparative advantage of
the theory was stronger, as one would expect, when interest rates
were unstable.
Is the observed difference between these correlation coefficients
significant? Could it have occured as a result of chance? To answer
this question, forward and current spot rates were correlated with
subsequently observed spot rates and the partial correlation coeffi-
cients were computed. The addition of current spot rates increased
the fraction of the observed variation explained from 58 to 59 per
cent. The partial regression coefficient for expectations was sig-
nificant and positwe (the partial regression coefficient was .86, with
a standard error of .14). In contrast, the partial regression coeffi-
cient for inertia was negative and also significant (the regression
coefficient was —.31,with a standard error of .18).
These results indicate clearly that the expectations hypothesis
does have predictive content that cannot be attributed to inertia.
However, the negative coefficient for inertia requires explanation.
The hypothesis presented here views the forward rate as a function
of expected spot rates a liquidity premium. But liquidity pre-Term Structure of Interest Rates 29
miums are a function of the level of spot rates: when current spot
rates are high, the premium over SPOt that is reflected in the for-
ward rate is also high, and vice versa. Hence, the larger the spot
rate, the larger the number that ought to be deducted from forward
rates to obtain the expected rates of the market. Therefore, the neg-
ative coefficient which is observed is consistent with the view that
liquidity premiums exist and vary directly with the level of interest
rates, more specifically with spOt rates.






5• — = +U.
The data used to evaluate the predictive content of the expecta-
tions hypothesis are reproduced in Chart 3. The thick line dep.icts
actual 91-day rates. The thin lines indicate forward rates adjusted
and unadjusted for liquidity premiums. The point of origin of the
thin lines at the thick line represents the moment a forward rate
is inferred; the terminal point of the thin line measures the mag-
nitude of the forward rate at the moment when the actual 91-day
rate corresponding to this forward rate can be observed. Liquidity
premiums were measured using the regression equation obtained
by regressing the difference between forward and realized 01-day
rates on current spot rates. These results suggest that within the
range omaturities encompasse(l by Treasury bills, expectations
do influence the term structure of interest rates, the market
forecasts future spot rates with some degree of accuracy. However,
to obtain the expectations of the market, liquidity premiums must
be deducted from forward rates.29
29Thefact that forward rates are usually higher than actual spot rates may
have led Hickman to abandon the search for a relationship between. them. An
inertia hypothesis could produce numerically closer predictions to spot. rates than
the expectations hypothesis, yet the latter could produce stronger correlations.
Itisthe strength of the correlations,if one accepts the view that liquidity
premiums exist, that is relevant for evaluating these alternatives, Insofar as
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Thus far, this analysis does not reveal how stable the liquidity
preference function is. Is the relationship between spot rates and
liquidity premiums stable enough to permit one to estimate liquid-
ity premiums for one business cycle and use these estimates to un-
cover successfully the expectations of the market, as distinguished
from forward rates, for a second cycle? To answer this question,
the regression of the difference between forward and subsequently
observed 28-day spot rates upon current 28-day spot rates, for the
two cycles from October 1949 through April 1958, was used to esti-
mate liquidity premiums for the following cycle. Then inertia and
expectations were compared as a means of forecasting subsequently
observed spot rates. Expectations was definitely the better predictor.
The standard error of estimate was .50 for inertia against .38 for ex-
The partial regression coefficient for inertia was —.07;
for expectations, it was .75. The standard error of the regression
coefficient was .19 for inertia and .16 for expectations. Multiple
correlationanalysis, using forwardrates adjusted for liquidity
premiums, yields results almost identical with those obtained with
unadjusted forward rates.30
These results suggested that the data Meiselman employed, which
were compiled by Durand, should be reexamined to see if forward
rates do predict subsequently observed spot rates. Hence forward
and current spot rates were considered as independent variables
and subsequently observed spot rates as the dependent variable
in a multiple regression equation. This involves using the same
data Meiselman used to compute what he regards as an error term.
No evidence of successful forecasting was detected; inertia appeared
to be the better independent variable.
To utilize more recent data that are qualitatively more corn-
not influence the correlation of forward with spot rates. For the two sets of seven
pairs of observations in Hickman's study, representing one-year forecasts, the
correlation coefficient for expectations was .725;for inertia, When both
variableswere includedin a multiple correlation, neither had a significant par.
tial correlation coefficient. Hence no basis is provided by correlation analysis for
arguing that one or the other variable explained the observed variation. If one
plots forward rates and the variant of inertia Hickman employed, there is almost
a constant difference between them.
30 For the three cycles, 1949 to 1961, the simple correlation coefficients inch-
cated that expectations explained 88 per cent of the observed variation whereas
inertia, i.e., extrapolating no change, explained 82 per cent.Term Structure of. Interest Rates 33
parableto the data Meiselman utilized, the experiment, performed
with forward and spot three-month Treasury bills was repeated
using monthly forward and spot one-year governments for 1958
through 1961. One- and two-year rates were readthe fixed ma-
turity yield curve published monthly in the Treasury Bulletin.3'
Again forward and current spot rates were treated as indepëndeni
variables and subsequently observed spot rates as the dependeht
variable. The result is consistent with that using three- ahd
month bills and reinforces the view that the market has
to forecast successfully. However, taken by itself it does not
stitute quite as convincing evidence of the existence of successfUl
forecasting. This is what one would expect; it is harder to for&äst
a year into the future than it is to forecast for three months.
If the rationalization of the statistical findings using three-
six-monthbills is correct, then forward rates should have a
coefficient and current one-year rates a negative one. One shoUld
also expect to find that the partial correlation coefficient for
pectations would be smaller in the case of one- and two-year
ury securities than it was for three- and six-month bills.
These anticipations are in general borne out. The sign of the re-
gression coefficient for one-year spot rates is negative. For three-
and six-month bills, this regression coefficient is 75 per cerit greater
than its standard error; for one- and two-year govêrnmêi-its, it is a
third larger than its standard error. For three- and six-nionth bills,
the regression coefficient for forward rates is positive arid sik times
its standard error; in the case of one- and two-year it
itsstandard
Possibly the most convincing evidence that the hiarket fore-
cast, with modest accuracy, one-year spot rates one yèär into the
future was obtained through the following experithent: Liquidity
premiums embodied in one-year forward rates for cycle
were estimated from an equation derived from the difteréhcê be-
tween forward and subsequently observed spot iegressed on
current one-year rates for the 1954—58 cycle. The expeCted tátes of
the market for the 1958—61 cycle were then obtained
31Iamindebtedto H. Irving Forman of the National stà these
measurements. They are reproduced, along with the related aiid spot
rates, in Appendix Table B!.34 Explanationsof the
the estimated liquidity premiums from forward rates. The mean
square errors in. the implicit forecasts of the market, i.e., the differ-
ence between forward rates less liquidity premiums and subse-
quently observed spot rates were compared with those generated
by assuming next year's one-year spot rates will be identical with
current rates. Although neither independent variable appeared in
some absolute sense to yield very good forecasts, it is clear that ex-
pectations was significantly better as an independent variable than
inertia. For thirty-five monthly observations, the mean square error
was 2.09 for inertia, .91 for The elimination of li-
quidity premiums contributed importantly tothis reduction in
error. Without such adjustment, the mean square error of the for-
ward rates was 1.91, only slightly less than that for inertia. These
results show that if one is predicting one-year rates one year hence,
and the current one-year rate is known, adding the two-year rate to
one's knowledge constitutes a valuable piece of information.
Time series of forward and spot one-year rates during the period
1958 to 1961 are reproduced as Chart 4. These data, as well as the
data for forward and spot three-month bills, suggest that the market
can detect spot rates that are abnormally high or low. All of the
forward rates are biased estimates. However, if one examines the
slopes of the lines connecting current spot rates with forward rates
for one year into the future, these lines appear flattest when cur-
rent spot rates are highest. Hence, if the market can abstract from
liquidity premiums (which produce the bias) then it appears that
the market can forecast. That is, when rates are high, the market
expects them to fall, and conversely, as the adjusted forward rates
in the lower part of the chart suggest. This is consistent with the
view that the market has some notion of what constitutes a normal
rate of interest.
What causes the observed difference between the results using
Durand's data on corporates and the recent data on one- and two-
year governments? The evidence provides the basis for highly
speculative answers at best. Durand's data encompass fifty-five years
and are yearly observations; the data on governments encompass
five years and are monthly observations. Possibly the market can-
not distinguish between cyclically and secularly high and low rates5
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CHART 4










SOURCE:Derived from Treasury yield curves, using one- and two-year rates. The
rates in the upper section of the chart are from Table B-I; those in the lower
section, from Tables B-2 and B-S.
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of 4nterest. If the market could anticipate cyclical changes better
than secular changes, there would be an observed difference in fore-
accuracy over one cycle as compared with many cycles.
When spot rates are high cyclically, their subsequent change is
different from that when they are high secularly. If the
forecasts of the market are the same in either case, studies of the
accuracy of forecasts will lead to different results depending upon
the time period under investigation.
Another avenue for explaining secular and cyclical differences is
the study of the stability of liquidity premiums over time. Before
the 1930's, judging by Durand's data, liquidity premiums were
much smaller or possibly nonexistent. There seems to have been a
structural change in the economy in this respect since the early
Possibly this can be attributed to the abolition of interest
on demand deposits, or perhaps to a change in attitude toward
risk that led to changes in liquidity premiums. In any case, insta-
bility of liquidity premiums could account for the observed differ-
ence in the secular and cyclical correlations of forward and one-
year spot rates.
Still another avenue for explaining these findings is data limita-
tions. Durand did not use a criterion such as least squares for his
curve fitting. He fitted only yield curves that do not have maxi-
or minimums. When his yield curves were not flat through-
out, they either increased or decreased monotonically with term
maturity and then flattened out. By definition, Durand could
observe a yield curve with any other shape. He offers no ex-
planation for this self-imposed constraint.
In the postwar period, when short-term rates have been above
long-term rates, yield curves have been hump shaped. These curves
at first rise with term to maturity, reach a maximum, and then fall
and finally flatten out. It is difficult to believe that this was not also
true during some of the fifty-five years encompassed by Durand's
data. If one examines both the data and the curves fitted, it is clear
that humped yield curves could just as correctly have been fitted
some of the time. Since this was not done, one- and two-year rates
derived from Durand's curves are probably high estimates of true
one- and two-year rates, and are high relative to longer maturities.Term Structure of Interest Rates 37
Ifone examines the yield curves Durand fitted to data in the
1920's, yield curves for governments and corporates have opposite
slopes for three of these years. Indeed, the data on governments
presented above show short-term governments yielding, on average,
less than long-term governments in the 1920's. Durand's findings
on corporates indicate just the opposite.
Another difficulty, ignored by both Hickman and MeiselLman, is
the fact that Durand's yield curves are drawn for coupon bonds.
Hence, the Hicksian formula for internal rates of return or yield
to maturity, which implicitly assumes the absence of coupons, is
inappropriate for computing forward rates. To compute forward
rates correctly, both coupons and yields to maturity, or internal
rates of return, must be known.
If one accepts the view that yield curves were, on average, posi.
tively sloped during the fifty-five years Durand observed, then coti-
pon rates for bonds with one or two years to maturity must have,
on average, exceeded internal rates of return. If coupons exceed
internal rates of return, then it can be shown that the Hicksian
formula underestimates forward rates. However, the measurement
errors which can be attributed to ignoring coupons seem to be
small compared to those attributable to uncertainties regarding
the shape of Durand's yield curves. Using coupons of 6 per cent,
errors in computing forward rates seem to be on the order of two
or three basis points.
The figures on bill rates collected provide new data to repeat
Meiselman's experiments. The results of tests of the expectations
hypothesis using Treasury bills are tabulated in Table 3. Treasury
bills with terms to maturity of less than six months are the source
of price data.
Since these correlations are all unambiguously significant, they
provide additional support for Meiselman's view that a relationship
between expectations and the term structure of interest rates exists.
His major conclusion—that there is validity in the expectations
hypothesis—is sound, despite his failure to isolate unanticipated
changes in interest rates and to recognize that forward rates were
not expected rates. What about the data Meiselman used? How









1.Error in forecast of two-week rateswith
changes in expected two—weekrates two
weeks hence .37 .40
2.Error in forecast of two-weekrates with
changes inexpected two—week rates eleven .
weeks hence .36 .26
3.Error in forecast of four—week rates
with changesin expected four—week
rates twelve weeks hence .21 .27
4.Error in forecast of six—week rates
with changesinexpected six—week rates
eighteen weeks hence .59 .62
5.Error in forecastofeight—week rates
with changesin expected eight—week
rates sixteen weeks hence .85 .59
Source
Line 1:Correlation of changes in predicted two-week bill rates with
forecasting errors implied by the expectations hypothesis, i.e., with
the difference between predicted and actual two—week rates.The error
termswere obtained by comparing predictions implied by four— andtwo—
weekbill rates with actual two—week bill rates two weeks later.The
prediction changes were obtained from the difference between the pre-
dicted two—week rate four weeks hence andthen,twoweekslater, two
weeksinto the future.The firstprediction was obtained through the
useof six— andfour—weekbills; the second was measuredthroughthe
use of four— and two—week bills.
Line 2:Correlation of thangea in predicted two—week bill rates as in-
ferred from eleven— and nine-week bills and, two weeks later, from
nine—and seven—week bills with the difference between predicted and
actual two-week rates.The independent variables for this and the test
described in Line 1 are identical.
Line 3:Correlation of changes in predicted four—week bill rateB withthe
prediction errors implied by the expectations hypothesis.The independ-
ent variable is the difference between predictions implied by eight— and
four—week bill rates and, four weeks later, actual four-week bill rates.
The dependent variable——the prediction change——is the difference between
the predicted four—week rate implied by the sixteen— and twelve—week bill
rates and, four weeks later, the predicted four—week rateimplied by the
twelve— andeight-weekbill rates.
Line4:Correlation of changes in predicted six—week bill rates with pre-
diction errors.The independent variable isthe difference between pre-
dictions impliedby twelve— and six—week bill rates and, six weeks later,
actual six—week bill rates.The dependent variable, the prediction
change, is the difference between the predicted six—week rate impliedTerm Structure of Interest Rates 39
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by thetwenty—four—and eighteen—week ratesand,six weeks later, the
predicted aix—week rate implied by the eighteen— and twelve—weekbill
rates.
Line 5:Correlation of changes in predicted eight—week bill rates with
prediction errors.The independent variable is the difference between
predictions implied by sixteen— and eight—week bill rates and, eight
weeks later, actual eight—week bill, rates.The dependent variable, the
prediction change, is the difference between the predicted eight-week
rate implied by the twenty—four— and sixteen—week rates and, eight weeks
later, the predicted eight—week rate implied by the sixteen—andeight—
weekrates.This may be illustrated by the following sample calcula—
tion.On November 28, 1961, thesixteen—week rate was 2.61, andthe
eight—weekrate 2.51.The expectations hypothesis implies that the
eight—week rateeight weeks hence, on January23,1962, is expected to
be 2.71.This is twice the sixteen-week rate less the eight—week rate.
The actual eight-week rate on January23,1962, eight weeks after
November 28, was 2.61.Hence the error is —.10.Thefirst prediction
inthe data from which Line 5 was derived wasinferredfrom the twenty—
four- and sixteen-week rates on November 28, 1961.These were 2.72 and
2.61respectively.Hence the predicted rate for March 20, 1962, which
is three times the twenty—four—week rate lesstwice thesixteen—week
rate, is 2.94.Eight weeks later, on January23,1962, the sixteen—week
rate was 2.72, andtheeight-week rate 2.61.Hence the predicted eight—
week rate for March 20, 1962, was 2.83, andtheprediction change—.11.
aThe existence of liquidity premiumsimpliesthat the errors as defined
by Maisetmanaretypically larger than the trueerrorsthe market committed.
The true errors are the differencesbetween fotward rates minus liquidity
premiums andspotrates; thetrue forecastrevisions are the observed
revisions net of liquidity differences.
data?The regression of the difference between forward and subse-
quently observed spot one-year rates against current one-year rates
reveals little variation in the "error" with the level of spot rates.
The regression coefficient is .09 with the standard error of .06, and
only about 4 per cent of the variation is explained. In contrast, for
the same regression using forward and spot one-year governments
for the 1958—61 cycle, the regression coefficient is one, with a stan-
dard error of .10, and 70. per cent of the variation is explained.
Clearly the different between forward and spot rates for the gov-
ernment data appears to be much more sensitive to variations in
spot rates than it is for Durand's data.
The reappearance of a seasonal in the money market in recent
years implies that it is possible to repeat Macaulay's experiment
with a new body of data. if the expectations hypothesis is correct,
seasonal adjustment factors ought to vary systematically with• term
to maturity. More specifically, just as the time money rates "an-
ticipated" seasonal changes in call money rates, changes in, say,40 Explanations of the
sixty-day seasonal adjustment factors ought to "anticipate" changes
in thirty-day factors. Hence it should be possible to constructa set
of seasonal adjustment factors for sixty-day rates if the factors for
thirty-day rates are known; knowledge of seasonal adjustment fac-
tors for thirty-day bills implies knowledge of these factors for bills
of longer maturity.
To test this hypothesis, weekly moving seasonal adjustment fac-
tors were computed for twenty-seven- and fifty-five-day bills for
1959, 1960, and 1961, using bid prices unadjusted for bankers dis-
count. If the expectations hypothesis is correct, a set of seasonal
adjustment factors for fifty-five-day bills constructed out of twenty-
seven-day factors ought to be more strongly correlated with actual
fifty-five-day factors than just twenty-seven-day factors alone. For
every week, a simple average of twenty-seven-day factors for that
week and fOr four weeks in the future was computed. This should
be, according to the expectations hypothesis, a fifty-five-day seasonal.
The correlation of this set of theoretical seasonal adjustments with
actual fifty-five-day adjustment factors was stronger than the cor-
relation between twenty-seven- and fifty-five-day factors. Converse
results ought to hold for a fifty-five-day seasonal adjustment con-
structed out of twenty-seven-day factors, if the adjustment factors
are obtained by averaging the current twenty-seven-day seasonal
with that of four weeks in the past. This seasonal, when correlated
with the fifty-five-day seasonal directly computed, ought to exhibit
less correlation than exists for the relationship between twenty-
seven- and fifty-five-day factors. Hence the rank ordering of cor-
TftBLE4
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relations alone, quite apart from the question of whether or not
there isa significant difference between the correlations, consti-
tutes evidence that the market anticipates seasonal movements in
rates. These findings are summarized in Table 4.
The Durand data and the data collected for this study provide a
means for discriminating between expectations and liquidity pref-
erence on the one hand and market segmentation on the other.
The market segmentation hypothesis implies that differences in
maturity account for differences in substitutability between secu-
rities.If maturity differences are held constant, then the substi-
tutability or the cross elasticity of demand ought also to be con-
stant.In contrast,the expectations hypothesis impliesthata
seven-year security is more like an eight-year security than a one.
year security is like a two-year security. The expectations hypothesis
implies that the common element in two securities separated by a
year in maturity increases monotonically as term to maturity in-
creases.
Similarly, if one accepts the view that liquidity preference varies
with the level of rates, then the premium increases as the level of
rates increases. Hence, if securities separated by a year in term to
maturity are examined, one should expect the common element to
increase as term to maturity increases. Because both liquidity pref-
e'ence and expectations have common implications, this test does
not discriminate between them. It does, however, produce evidence
that must be regarded. as discriminating between expectations and
liquidity preference on the one hand and market segmentation on
the other.
The foregoing tests were Perfolmed with two independent sets
of data: the Durand data that Meiselman used and yields to ma-
turity, for the latest cycle, read off the yield curve in the Treasury
Bulletin by a draftsman. The test employed was a simple rank test.
The expectations and liquidity preference hypotheses imply that
the correlations between securities separated by a year in term to
maturity ought to decrease monotonically as term to maturity in-
creases. Hence the theory forecasts a set of ranks that can be com-
pared with the observed ranks to see if they are positively corre-
lated.42 Explanations of the
Consistent results were obtained using these independent sets
of data. The ranks predicted by the expectations and liquidity pref-
erence hypotheses and the actual ranks were highly correlated. Each
set of data consisted of nine pairs of ranks. Using the Olds rank
correlation test, and interpreting the implications of the liquidity
preference and expectations as implying a one-tail test, both signifi-
cance levels were under 2 per cent.32
The foregoing analysis of the implications of liquidity preference
and expectations for the correlation between the yields of securi-
ties separated by a constant time span as term to maturity increases
also implies that yield curves ought to flatten Out with maturity.
Given that the weights assigned to marginal, rates of interest, in the
determination of average or internal, rates of return, decrease with
maturity, then yield curves must flatten out with maturity. This
assumes that the variance in forward rates is independent of term
to maturity.
The evidence presented supports the Hicksian theory of the term
structure of interest rates; it supports the view that both expecta-
tions and liquidity preference determine the term structure of in-
terest rates. These results show that forward rates should be inter-
preted as expected rates plus a liquidity premium. If forward rates
are so interpreted, then the expectations of the market seem to fore-
cast subsequently observed short-maturity spot rates; the relation-
ship between expected and subsequently observed spot rates can-
not be rationalized as the workings of chance.
With respect to the market segmentation hypothesis, the evidence
is less clear. These findings show that this hypothesis is not of the
same magnitude as liquidity preference and expectations in the de-
termination of the term structure of rates. The fact that forward
rates embody short-term forecasts of spot rates that have a per-
ceptible degree of accuracy implies that liquidity premiums are
stable. Hence the scope for the impact of market segmentation
upon the term structure of rates must be limited. The Meiselman
findings on the relationship between what he termed forecast re-
visions and errors support this view, as do the tests presented here.
32Thetest employed is described in W. Allen Wallis, "Rough-and-Ready Sta-
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Aproponent of market segmentation may argue that these tests,
in particular, the test based on holding absolute maturity differ-
ences constant while varying relative maturity differences, are based
on incorrect interpretations of market segmentation. Economic
literature does not contain a statement of the market segmentation
hypothesis that is as rigorous as those available either for liquidity
preference or expectations. Therefore, the possibility of misinter-
pretation cannot be easily dismissed. The Walker findings which
deal with the root of the market segmentation hypothesis are par-
ticularlyrelevant. He showed that institutions have sharply changed
the maturity composition of their holdings in response to market
forces. This seems to strike at the very foundation of the market
segmentation thesis. The only contrary evidence uncovered—this
is also subject to the same uncertainties about its relevance—is the
existence of negative forward rates in the bill market. Such oc-
currences seem to be rare, and therefore relatively insignificant,
but should not be dismissed entirely. There is always the possi-
bility that more of suchevidence exists or that the effects of market
segmentation are relatively subtle and the tests employed too crude
to detect its existence.33
38There were negative forward rates in the bill market in the At that
time rates were relatively low and taxes on bank deposits in Illinois were high
enough to make it profitable to take a negative yield rather than be subjectto
taxation on deposits.